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Abstract
It is widely recognized that the secular Indian state unlike its Western counterpart 
does not follow the strict separation of religion and state, opting to intervene in the 
domain of religion by treating religions equally. This article examines how the concept 
of equal treatment of religions is applied in the legal domain by an intellectual history 
of the Ayodhya litigation and argues that the courts cannot treat religions equally due 
to the incompatible nature of the claims made by the parties i.e. the history of reli-
gion claim of the Hindus vis-a-vis the property rights claim of the Muslims. Departing 
significantly from the current consensus about the litigation being characterized by 
defective legal interpretation and political influences, it further argues that the real le-
gal challenge in resolving this dispute is addressing the theological frameworks within 
modern property law which are dependent on a set of normative inferences embed-
ded in colonial discourse.
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1 Introduction
Here is a small piece of land (1500 square yards) where angels fear to 
tread. It is full of innumerable land mines. We are required to clear it… 
Once angels were made to bow before Man. Sometimes he has to justify 
the said honour. This is one of those occasions. We have succeeded or 
failed? No one can be a judge in his own cause.
September 30, 2010. Justice S.U. Khan1
It is most unfortunate that a masjid should have been built on land spe-
cially held sacred by the Hindus, but as that event occurred 356 years 
ago it is too late now to remedy the grievance. All that can be done is to 
maintain the parties in status quo.
District Justice Chamier2
The transformation of the conflict surrounding 1,500 square yards in the small 
town of Ayodhya, in colonial North India, from a local dispute involving the 
ruling Shia king of Awadh, his Hindu and Sunni Muslim subjects, and the Brit-
ish colonial regime3 into one of the best known examples of inter-religious 
tension in modern India can be traced in the one hundred years that have 
lapsed between the pronouncements of the two judges. How did a colonial 
judge’s assumption that a mosque was built on land held sacred by the Hin-
dus turn into a complex property dispute about adverse possession, title, and 
customary usage replete with historical and theological claims? What were the 
burdens on the post-colonial judge to decide such a case in accordance with 
the constitutional guarantees of secularism and religious freedom in India?
1 Gopal Singh Visharad v Zahoor Ahmed ,o.s. No.1 of 1989 (Regular Suit No.2 of 1950) Nirmohi 
Akhara v. Priya Dutta Ram, o.s. No.3 of 1989 (Regular Suit No.26 of 1959), Sunni Central Board 
of Waqfs, u.p. and others v. Gopal Singh Visharad (since deceased) and others o.s No.4 of 1989, 
(Regular Suit No.12 of 1961), Bhagwan Sri Ram Lala Virajman and others v. Rajendra Singh and 
others o.s No.5 of 1989 (Regular Suit No.236 of 1989) (hereinafter, the Ayodhya judgment); at 
http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/DisplayAyodhyaBenchLandingPage.do.
2 Civil Appeal No.27 of 1886 in Infra n. 39.
3 See Juan Cole’s extensive study of the Awadh state in Roots of North Indian Shi’ism in Iran and 
Iraq: Religion and State in Awadh, 1722–1859 (University of California Press, 1988), particularly 
the chapter on communal relations.
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These are questions that have not been satisfactorily answered in the 
Ayodhya dispute, a litigation on whether the birthplace of the Hindu deity Ram 
is on the site of a mosque known as the Babri Masjid, allegedly built by the Mu-
ghal Emperor Babur four centuries ago. According to Hindu devotees, Babur al-
legedly demolished a temple dedicated to Ram on the spot of Ram’s birthplace 
and built a mosque. This dispute, which originated in 1885, has continued well 
into the 21sth century, leading to widespread violence and conflict, and the de-
struction of the mosque on December 6, 1992 by Hindu political groups, which 
then demanded the rebuilding of the temple on the site of the demolished 
mosque. These demands were taken up by the Allahabad High Court, which had 
jurisdiction in the federal region in the Ayodhya case. In a controversial ruling, 
on September 30, 2010, the High Court pronounced the sanctum sanctorum 
or the innermost shrine of the mosque to be the birthplace of the deity Ram. 
Among other decisions on ownership of land, the High Court also awarded own-
ership of the site to representatives of the Hindu group, Vishwa Hindu Parishad.
This decision evoked sharp criticism from a wide range of commentators in 
the Indian press. An editorial in a leading Indian magazine commented that 
the judgement showed “insufficient understanding of the secular tenets of the 
Constitution.”4 Yet another editorial criticized the court for not restoring faith 
in secularism and justice to minorities.5 Legal scholars, Rajeev Dhawan6 and 
A.G. Noorani,7 pointed out various legal deficiencies in the judgment, and 
historian Romila Thapar maintained that it had “annulled respect for history, 
seeking to replace it with religious faith.”8 The only voice to depart from this 
consensus was that of the political scientist, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, who de-
clared that it was a judgment that befitted India, and was not an implausible 
way of strengthening secularism.9
As these reactions show, the resolution to the Ayodhya dispute has been 
framed mainly as a question of the ability of the Indian state to uphold its 
4 V. Venkatesan, “Weak legal basis”, 27(21) Frontline (2010). It can be accessed at http://www 
.frontline.in/static/html/fl2721/stories/20101022272101700.htm.
5 Editorial “The Undermining of Justice” 45(41) The Economic and Political Weekly (2010), 7.
6 V. Venkatesan, “Seriously flawed” (Interview with Rajeev Dhawan), 27(21) Frontline (2010). It 
can be accessed at http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2721/stories/20101022272102000.
htm.
7 A.G. Noorani, “Muslims wronged”, 27(21) Frontline (2010). It can be accessed at http://
www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2721/stories/20101022272112500.htm.
8 Romila Thapar, “The verdict on Ayodhya: A historian’s perspective”, The Hindu, October 2, 
2010.
9 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “The leap and the faith”, The Indian Express, October 1, 2010.
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constitutional commitment to secularism.10 Is the Indian state neutral and 
secular, and can it treat religions equally? How does one enforce the principle 
of secularism in India? Are religious minorities protected under the Indian 
Constitution?
The answers to these questions may appear to be straightforward. The right 
to the freedom of religion is a fundamental right under the Indian Constitu-
tion, specifically outlined in Articles 25 to 28.11 There are allied rights that pro-
vide equality before the law, such as Article 14, and guarantee freedom from 
discrimination on the basis of religion, such as Article 15.
The protection of religious freedom offered by the Indian state appears to 
conform to the models prescribed in international law, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966, and the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 
1981.12
These forms of legal protection, however, do not clarify the true relation-
ship between state and religion in India. This topic was the subject of much 
debate and discussion in the Constituent Assembly, where the idea of the strict 
separation between state and religion gave way to the concept of equal treat-
ment of religions,13 allowing the Indian state to interfere in religion in the guise 
of treating religions equally. Constitutional provisions have empowered the 
state to abolish social practices, including untouchability, and to intervene in 
10 Only a few scholars have attempted to understand the Ayodhya dispute outside the 
framework of secularism. Using Indian philosophy, Ramachandra Gandhi shows how the 
exclusivity of the claims of Hindu political groups privileges the birthplace of Ram but 
ignores another spot revered as Sita’s kitchen (Sita is Rama’s wife) within the disputed 
site. In doing so, the claims of these Hindu groups negate Indian spirituality. See Ram-
achandra Gandhi, Sita’s Kitchen: A Testimony of Faith and Inquiry (State University of New 
York Press, 1992).
11 These include the freedom of religion or conscience, more specifically, the right to pro-
fess, practice, and propagate religion, the right to form educational institutions for reli-
gious or charitable purposes, and a prohibition of religious instruction in state-funded 
institutions.
12 For a discussion on how relations between state and religion can be schematized in terms 
of various approaches, see Yuval Jobani and Nahshon Perez, “Women of the Wall: A Nor-
mative Analysis of the Place of Religion in the Public Sphere”, 3(3) Oxford Journal of Law 
and Religion (2014), 484–505. The Indian state may fall within the evenhandedness ap-
proach, i.e., equal treatment although it has often been accused of taking the dominant 
culture approach, i.e., favouring the culture of the majority in making decisions that in-
volve religion.
13 Shefali Jha, “Secularism in the Constituent Assembly Debates, 1946–1950”, 37(30) Econom-
ic and Political Weekly (2002), 3175–3180.
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the management of Hindu religious institutions.14 Religious communities are 
permitted to have their own systems of marriage and inheritance, known as 
personal laws, which are subject to judicial control. Separate legal frameworks, 
in the form of wakfs and Hindu endowments, govern Muslim and Hindu places 
of worship.15 The Indian state engaged in a large-scale reform of Hindu law 
in the 1950s16 and has continued to make amendments to the personal laws 
of religious communities. Recent amendments have included amending the 
Christian personal law relating to divorce through the Indian Divorce (Amend-
ment) Act of 2001,17 and Hindu succession law through the Hindu Succession 
(Amendment) Act of 2005.
This form of secularism has been understood by many intellectuals as viable 
and necessary,18 but has drawn sharp criticism from various Hindu political 
groups, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp), as “pseudo-secularism.”19 
These groups have alleged that constitutional provisions on secularism are 
being misused to provide concessions to religious minorities, an example be-
ing the lack of initiative by the Indian state in reforming Muslim personal law 
while reforming Hindu law. Therefore, there is no equal treatment of religions. 
These stances have affected the Ayodhya litigation, the bjp, and other Hindu 
14 Found in Articles 17 and 25 of the Constitution.
15 Christian churches are generally governed according to the model of the English trust. 
Separate legislation governs places of worship, known as gurudwaras, belonging to the 
Sikh community.
16 See Duncan Derrett, “The Codification of Hindu Law” in Religion, Law and the State in 
India (Oxford University Press, 1968), 321–351, for an account of these reforms.
17 For a critical analysis of the amendments to Christian personal law and the debates be-
hind them, see two articles by Flavia Agnes titled “Minority Identity and Gender Con-
cerns”, 36(42) Economic and Political Weekly (2001), 3973–3976, and “Church, State and 
Secular Spaces”, 35 (33) Economic and Political Weekly (2000), 2901–2904.
18 Rajeev Bhargava, “What is Secularism For” and Charles Taylor “Modes of Secularism” in 
Rajeev Bhargava and Partha Chatterjee (eds.), Secularism and Its Critics (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 1998), 486–542. Gary Jacobsohn, in The Wheel of Law: India’s Secularism in Com-
parative Constitutional Context (Princeton University Press 2003), argues that the Indian 
state practices ameliorative secularism, which involves an agenda of dismantling social 
hierarchy. An exception to this consensus about the affirmative effects of secularism is 
Ashis Nandy, who argues that secularism in India is unable to draw upon non-institu-
tionalized forms of pluralism shown by how different religious communities have lived 
together in Indiain the past. See Nandy, “The twilight of certitudes: Secularism, Hindu 
nationalism and other masks of deculturation”, 1(3) Postcolonial Studies (1998), 283–298.
19 This term came into popular usage in the 1980s, when the bjp sought to assert its presence 
nationally; it was first used in 1969 by the bjp leader, Atal Behari Vajpayee. See Christophe 
Jafferelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 1990’s (Penguin, 
1999), 376.
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political parties, which view the movement to establish a temple in Ayodhya as 
evidence that their ideology, known as Hindutva,20 is an effective alternative 
to “pseudo-secularism.” Others, however, have criticized the judicial interven-
tions in this dispute as a failure of secularism.21
The present article explains how the Indian state has upheld secularism as a 
legal and constitutional commitment through the principle of the equal treat-
ment of religions in the course of the Ayodhya dispute. To do so, we must con-
front the issue of how religion is understood by the law, how the courts define 
religion, and the conceptual frameworks and compulsions that they face in 
making such a decision. Finally, we answer the question of how these consid-
erations have affected the Ayodhya dispute.
The Supreme Court has displayed considerable ambiguity regarding the 
definition of religion. In S.P. Mittal v. Union of India,22 the Court noted that re-
ligion was incapable of precise judicial definition because there are problems 
with the concept itself, “some religions being more easily identifiable as reli-
gious and some are easily not identifiable as religious.” This pronouncement 
was made despite efforts to develop standards for the definition of religion in 
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshimindra 
Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,23 where it was held that the courts must 
consult the doctrines of a religion defined in its “essential practices” in order to 
determine whether any set of practices were religious.24
Such difficulties in the definition of religion by the law are increasingly no-
ticeable also in other jurisdictions and also in international law .25  However,the 
20 Hindutva is a form of Hindu nationalism promoted by the bjp, outlined in the works of 
its leaders, such as Savarkar and Gowalkar. See V.D Savarkar, Hindutva: What is a Hindu 
(Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969), and M.S. Gowalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined (Kale 
Publications, 1947).
21 Nivedita Menon, “The Ayodhya Judgment: What Next?” 66(31) Economic and Political 
Weekly (2011), 81–89; Ratna Kapur, “A Leap of Faith: The Construction of Hindu Majori-
tarianism through Secular Law”, South Atlantic Quarterly (2014), 109–128; Rajeev Dhawan, 
“The Ayodhya Judgement: Encoding Secularism in the Law”, 29 (48) Economic and Politi-
cal Weekly (1994), 3034–3040.
22 1983 scc (1)51.
23 air 1954 sc 282.
24 This test, however, proved impossible to implement. The courts handed down contra-
dictory decisions, prompting criticism that with the application of the test the courts 
have been serving a “reformist agenda,” leading to an “unmanageable jurisprudence of 
religious freedoms.” See Rajeev Dhawan, “Religious Freedom in India”, 35(1) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law (1987), 209–254.
25 For difficulties in defining religion in international law, see T. Jeremy Gunn, “The Com-
plexity of Religion and the Definition of ‘“Religion”’ under International Law”, 16 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal (2003), 189–215. For questions regarding about the limits of the 
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unintelligibility of religion as a legal phenomenon in India leads to further dif-
ficulties in determining the relationship between the state and religion. For 
instance, how does the Indian state decide the domain of its “interference,” i.e, 
how does it demarcate activities as religious or secular when it comes to ben-
efits, policies and exemptions in the areas of taxation, education, and charity. 
Such demarcation becomes crucial because both institutions and individuals 
stand to benefit from such policies.
Ronojoy Sen, in an exhaustive treatment of the Supreme Court decisions 
on religion, argues that the essential practices test has evolved over the sev-
eral decades it has been in use, and that this test has been influenced by the 
views and attitudes of the judges themselves.26 Initially, under the influence of 
Justice Gajendragadkar, the court attempted an agenda of social reform, seek-
ing to eliminate “unessential” practices that they deemed superstitious or ir-
rational, and rationalizing religion by putting the state in charge of religious 
endowments. This attitude underwent a transformation in the 1990s owing to 
Justice Ramaswamy, who provided a philosophical basis for the test, empha-
sizing dharma or good consciousness as the core of religion, thus placing the 
emphasis on religious experience.
Marc Galanter argues that the jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme Court 
on the definition of Hinduism reflects judicial preoccupation with the reform 
of Hinduism into an entity that can be easily regulated.27 Judges may feel an 
obligation to contribute to a sense of nationhood by providing a unified de-
scription of Hinduism. According to Galanter, this raises the wider question of 
whether judges are legitimately bound by the Constitution to actively engage 
in an exercise of reinterpreting Hinduism.
Both Galanter and Sen raise valid questions about the role of judges in cre-
ating doctrine. This does not answer, however, the question about the theoreti-
cal framework that courts use in understanding religion. Sen’s argument that 
the Supreme Court rulings are a product of a discourse embedded in classical 
Hinduism, which originated in the 19th century and provided the basis for the 
argument that social reform was required, does not address the conceptual 
public sphere in the context of the neutral secular state in Germany, see Karl-Heinz La-
deur and Ino Augsberg, “The Myth of the Neutral State: The relationship between state 
and religion in the face of new challenges”, 8(2) German Law Journal (2007), 143–152. For 
an appraisal of the constraints of American courts in defining religion, see Winnifred Fall-
ers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton University Press, 2005).
26 Ronojoy Sen, Articles of Faith: Religion, Secularism and the Indian Supreme Court (Oxford 
University Press, 2010).
27 Marc Galanter “Hinduism, Secularism and the Indian Judiciary” in Law and Society in 
Modern India (Oxford University Press, 1989), 237–258.
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framework within which this discourse developed.28 Such a framework is pro-
vided by Ratna Kapur, who argues that the inability of the Supreme Court to 
interpret secularism in the right manner lies in its understanding of Hindu-
ism. Influenced by colonialism, the Court has privileged Ram as supreme deity 
and Hinduism as a scripture-based religion akin to the Abrahamic religions, 
all of which have foundational scriptures and centralized doctrinal schools of 
interpretation.29 This “modern and singular construction” of Hinduism has 
converged with the idea of Hinduism propounded by Hindu political parties, 
such as the bjp, and other entities that share its agenda, such as the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (rss) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (vhp).30
This answer goes beyond Galanter and Sen in outlining the conceptual 
framework that lies at the basis of the Court’s understanding of Hinduism, 
which both judges and lawyers must grapple with. It also raises the impor-
tant question of why does such a “construction” of Hinduism allow the Hindu 
political parties to deploy the discourse of secularism so effectively in a judi-
cial context. Answering this question requires engagement with the concept 
of religion itself. Scholars of religious studies31 have shown that religion as a 
concept is studied through the Christian theological framework, and that one 
needs to be critical of the domain of the secular. A more specific perspective 
on the domain of the secular is provided by Gil Anidjar,32 who argues that 
Christianity is a secularized religion, having disenchanted itself into private 
and public, politics and economics, and the religious and secular, and view-
ing other communities and traditions as “religion,” although it was the only 
28 See Sen, supra n. 26, 1.
29 See Kapur, supra n. 21, 115. Kapur’s analysis is based not only on the Ayodhya litigation but 
also on the various judgments on Hindutva that involved charges of hate speech against 
politicians from Hindu political parties, and their defense that these were legitimate ap-
peals to Hindutva. In the main judgment, Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Shri Prabhakar 
Kashinath Kunte and Ors. 1996 scc (1) 130, the Supreme Court held that Hindutva was a 
way of life leading to the interpretation that the statements pertaining to hate speech 
were secular. According to Kapur, such an interpretation, which did not distinguish be-
tween Hinduism and Hindutva, failed to see how these political parties were appropriat-
ing secularism.
30 See Kapur, supra n. 21, 121–122.
31 See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam (The John Hopkins University Press, 1993); Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Re-
ligious Studies (Oxford University Press, 2000); S.N. Balagangadhara, The Heathen in His 
Blindness: Asia, the West and the Dynamic of Religion (Brill Publications, 1994); Richard 
King, Orientalism and Religion: Post Colonial Theory and the Mystic East (Routledge, 1999).
32 Gil Anidjar, “Secularism”, 33 Critical Inquiry (2006), 59–60.
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example of religion.33 Anidjar’s findings on the linkages between modern so-
cial categories and religion along withthe conclusions reached by other schol-
ars should make us rethink our understanding of secular law and compel us 
to re-examine the various legal concepts in operation in the Ayodhya dispute, 
such as the wakf and the endowment, which are used to make Muslim and 
Hindu claims to property. In the course of such re-examination, we must ex-
amine whether these concepts, along with modern property law, are free from 
their colonial origins, which reflect British colonial perceptions of religion.
I use the analysis of the Ayodhya dispute, particularly the judgment of Sep-
tember 30, 2010, to shed light on the inability of the Indian state to apply the 
doctrine of secularism in a neutral manner. I argue that this legal dispute brings 
to light the paradoxes and difficulties in the inability of Indian secularism to 
treat religions equally. I show that the problem that arises is the incompatible 
nature of the claims, the Hindu claim being based on the history of religion, as 
opposed to the Muslim claim, which is juridical in nature and based on title to 
property. Such claims reveal that the legal challenge in demarcating the reli-
gious and the secular is not a matter of boundaries, but has to do with address-
ing the theological frameworks of property law, which are dependent on a set 
of normative inferences embedded in colonial discourse.
The objective of the present article is not to analyze the legal argumenta-
tion favoring either side, or how political parties and Hindu groups, such as the 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad, have tried to influence the outcome of the litigation. 
Instead, I seek to review the intellectual history of the dispute. I begin by trac-
ing the shifts in the legal history of the Ayodhya dispute. By the narration of 
such a legal history I seek to delineate the broader conceptual contours of the 
dispute and the conditions that make possible to e allow facts and represent 
them in the realm of law.34 Next, I focus on the September 30, 2010 judgment, 
with particular emphasis on the role of colonial writings, such as gazetteers 
and travel accounts, showing the background against which competing claims 
of Muslim property rights and Hindu historical-theological rights unfold. 
I show that the courts are drawn into a discourse on sovereignty, seen as control 
and authority over territory, which brings into operation secular property law. 
33 See also Jakob De Roover, Sarah Claerhout, and S.N. Balagangadhara, “Liberal Political 
Theory and the Cultural Migration of Ideas”, 39(5) Political Theory (2011), 571–599, for an 
understanding of the process by which Christian ideas become secularized.
34 I am inspired by Reinhart Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, 
Spacing Concepts, (Todd Samuel Presler, trans.) (Stanford University Press, 2002) and 
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge: The Discourse on Language (Sheridan 
Smith, trans.) (Pantheon Books, 1972).
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The property law concepts used to determine religious rights are influenced 
by a Christian theological framework based on the cognitive background of 
the British colonizers. The operation of these concepts is brought into being 
by colonial discourse. I conclude by arguing that we need to rethink property 
law in the context of its ability to regulate religion, and that the challenge lies 
in unraveling colonial discourse.35
2 The Legal History of the Ayodhya Dispute: A Reading of Its Shifts
2.1 Colonial Beginnings
An exploration of the legal problems around the disputed site of Ayodhya in-
volves engagement with the law governing places of worship. Section 2 (c) of 
The Places of Worship Act, 1991,36 states that the place of worship “means a 
temple, mosque, gurudwara, church, monastery or any other place of public 
religious worship of any religious denomination or any section thereof, by 
whatever name called.” As noted, the legal categories of the wakf and the Hin-
du endowment govern temples and mosques, respectively. A wakf is defined 
under Section 2 ( r ) of the Wakfs Act, 1995 (an enactment by the federal gov-
ernment of India), as the permanent dedication of a property recognized by 
the Muslim law as pious, religious, or charitable, and which requires certain el-
ements, such as a mutavalli or manager of the property. Each federal state has 
its own Wakf Board, with separate rules of operation. A Hindu endowment is 
defined in a similar manner, as being dedicated for purposes that are religious 
or charitable within the framework of religious and charitable endowment en-
actments that are separate for each federal state.
The ambit of the place of worship can include other entities, such as dargahs 
(saints’ tombs), being classified under wakfs or vrindavanas (sacred groves) 
under Hindu endowments.37 Until the beginning of the 20th century, however, 
such legal entities did not exist, and instances of temples and mosques were 
35 This article does not examine the various criminal cases filed in connection with the dis-
pute because these are merely an outcome of the property dispute.
36 This enactment, brought into force to negate any further claims on places of worship by 
various communities, provides that no alteration shall be made to any place of worship 
after August 15, 1947. But it was ineffective in preventing the demolition of the mosque at 
Ayodhya because it did not apply to that site.
37 Section  2(k) (i) of the Wakf Act, 1995, refers to a person interested in a wakf as being 
entitled to worship at dargahs, among other places. For vrindavana being a place of wor-
ship, see Section  2(24) of the Karnataka Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments 
Act, 1997.
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defined by their function, and not an abstract purpose.38 Legislation concep-
tualizing these categories was enacted only in the early 20th century, showing 
the links between post-colonial legislation and colonial legal culture.
It is therefore important to examine the Ayodhya dispute from the point 
of view of its colonial origins. From such a perspective, it is unsurprising that 
many commentators trace this dispute to events in the colonial period, which 
saw increased conflict between religious communities amid British efforts to 
annex the kingdom of Awadh (also spelt as Oudh in British records), citing 
a deterioration in law and order.39 Juan Cole points out that these conflicts 
involve a complex patchwork of authorities, including the Shia king of Awadh, 
the Shia ulema, the British government, and their attempts to regulate the re-
lationships between Hindus, Sunnis, and Shias in the region.40
The roots of the conflict can be traced to a dispute in 1855, when Sunni Mus-
lim protesters became convinced that the Hanumangarhi temple, dedicated to 
Hanuman, a Hindu deity, had been built atop the site of an old mosque, and 
they determined to tear it down and restore the mosque. This became serious 
enough, in February of 1855, to be noticed by Maj.-Gen. Outram, Calcutta’s Res-
ident in Lucknow, who wrote to the king Vajid `Ali Shah, asking him to arrest a 
Sunni Muslim in Faizabad, by the name of Shah Ghulam Husayn, and a mili-
tant cleric supporting him, known as “Mawlavi Sahib.”41 In 1855, 500 Muslims 
clashed at Ayodhya with some 8,000 Hindus (many of them ascetics known 
as Bairagis), leading to a massacre of the outnumbered Muslims. Angered by 
this event, Sunni Muslims pressurized the king to constitute a commission of 
inquiry, which came to the conclusion that no mosque had ever existed on the 
site of Hanumangarhi. This led to further clashes between the Sunni Muslims 
and Hindus, the Sunni Muslims being infuriated by the Shia king’s inability to 
take action on the issue. The British Resident’s pressure on the monarch not to 
38 For a description of the regulation of places of worship in the princely state of Mysore, 
and an account of the development of the place of worship in the context of its legal his-
tory, see Geetanjali Srikantan, “The Difficulties of Religious Pluralism in India: Analysing 
the Place of Worship as a Legal Category in the Ayodhya and Bababudangiri Disputes”, ari 
Working Paper No. 187 (2012).
39 Sushil Srivatsava, “How the British saw the Issue”, in Gopal Sarvepalli (ed.), Anatomy of a 
Confrontation. The Babri Masjid Ramjanmabhoomi issue (Penguin Books, 1991), 38–57. A 
colonial history is provided in A.G Noorani, The Babri Masjid Question 1528–2003, Volumes 
1 and 2 (Tulika Books, 2004).
40 Supra n. 3.
41 Ibid. A description of the dispute is provided at 244–249.
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act against the Hindus further complicated the matter, leading to riots by the 
Sunni Muslims, which were quelled by the army of the Shia king.42
An entirely different account of this dispute entered judicial discourse in 
1885, when one of the holy men, called the Mahant Raghubar Das, filed a suit 
for permission to construct a temple at the chabutra (a raised platform), claim-
ing that he could do so because he owned and possessed the land on which 
the chabutra was built. The event that became judicial facts was that a riot 
occurred in 1855 at a nearby temple, called Hanumangarhi, following claims 
by Muslims that it had previously been a mosque. The riot started at Hanuman 
Garhi, where the Muslims were repelled by the Hindus. Several Muslims died 
and were buried around the disputed area. A railing was built dividing the land 
in such a way that Muslims used the inner courtyard near the Masjid, and the 
Hindus the outer courtyard. The Mahant pleaded that a temple be constructed 
over the chabutra, as the climate conditions (rain, sun, and extreme cold) often 
caused hardship for pilgrims and for the Bairagis themselves. The court noted 
that the chabutra was in the possession of Hindus whose “ownership could 
not be questioned, and around it there is the wall of the mosque and the word 
Allah is inscribed on it.”43 This claim was rejected by the court on the ground 
that:44
If a temple is constructed on the Chabutra at such a place then there will 
be the sound of bells of the temple and shankh when both Hindus and 
Muslims pass from the same way, and if permission is given to Hindus 
for constructing temple then one day or the other a criminal case will be 
started and thousands of people will be killed… awarding permission to 
construct the temple at this juncture is to lay the foundation of riot and 
murder, hence between Hindus and Muslims, which are two different reli-
gions, in view of justice the reliefs claimed should not be granted.
The case then went to the District Judge of the Faizabad court, who agreed 
with the decision of the lower court and dismissed the appeal, although noting 
specifically that the chabutra indicated the birthplace of Ram, the Hindu deity. 
42 See also the chapter “Sacred Space and Holy War: The Issue of Jihad”, in Juan Cole, Sacred 
Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam (i.b. Tauris, 2002), 
161–172, upon which the abovementioned description is based.
43 For a narration of these facts, see Sub Judge Hari Kishan, Faizabad, in a Judgment dated 
December 24, 1885, quoted in Noorani, Volume 1 (note 39).
44 Ibid., 181.
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The Mahant then appealed to the highest court in the province. The Judicial 
Commissioner noted that:45
…the Hindus of Ajodhya want to create a new temple … over… the birth-
place of Shri Ram Chandar. Now this spot is situated within the precinct 
of the grounds surrounding a mosque erected some 350 years ago owing 
to the bigotry and tyranny of the Emperor Babur, who purposely chose 
this holy spot according to Hindu legend as the site of his mosque.
The Judicial Commissioner supported the decisions of the lower courts and 
also noted that the Hindus have constantly been trying to expand their rights. 
He also dismissed the appeal on the ground that the plaintiff was not in any 
sense the proprietor of the land in question.
These three 19th century decisions by colonial courts are significant for the 
manner in which they establish certain facts without enquiry or proof. These 
facts are that the birthplace of Ram lies within the precincts of the mosque 
and that the mosque was built by the Mughal ruler Babur to humiliate the 
conquered Hindus. The decision by the Judicial Commissioner also added two 
other dimensions to these facts. It understood the Mahant’s claim to “owner-
ship” as title within the framework of modern property law, and it converted 
the Mahant’s ownership claim from an individual claim on behalf of his com-
munity into a property claim on behalf of a “religion,” i.e., the “Hindus.”
2.2 20th Century Shifts and the Transformation of the Dispute
Establishing these facts as some form of legal truth influenced the manner in 
which the dispute developed in the 20th century. After 1886, the first event of 
consequence occurred in 1934, when riots were triggered by cow slaughter, and 
the Babri Masjid was damaged and rebuilt.46 An inquiry was conducted in 1936 
by the Commissioner of Waqfs over a disputed land, to determine whether it 
was wakf. The Commissioner determined that the Babri Masjid was built by 
Babur, who was a Sunni Muslim.47 This report provided the juridical basis for 
the property, showing that it fulfilled the requirements for the property to be 
considered wakf, i.e., it had been built by Babur. The Commissioner appointed 
45 See the Judgment of W. Young, Officiating Judicial Commissioner, Oudh, dated 1 Novem-
ber 1886, quoted in Noorani, Volume 1 (note 39), 187–188.
46 See Parmanand Singh, “Legal History of the Ayodhya Litigation”, 17(2) Indian Bar Review 
(1991), 31, quoted in Noorani (note 39).
47 Report of Faizabad District Wakf Commissioner, February 8, 1941, quoted in Noorani, Vol-
ume 1 (note 39).
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Syed Abdul Baqi as the mutavalli (the manager of the wakf). Such a wakf was 
legitimized by grants from previous Muslim rulers, which the British coloniz-
ers had continued. The ruling also reconciled sectarian differences by stating 
that even if the mutavalli was Shia, the wakf remained a Sunni wakf because 
the founder was the Emperor Babur, who was a Sunni Muslim. This report was 
adduced in the 1945 litigation between the Shia Central Board of Waqfs and 
the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs in the court of the civil judge in Faizabad.48 
The report of the Commissioner had left unanswered the question of the sect 
that Abdul Baqi belonged to, but the judgment of 1945 further reconciled sec-
tarian differences by asserting that Baqi was a Persian, and therefore a Shia, 
but the wakf was Sunni because it was founded by Babur a Sunni Muslim. This 
assertion was based, among other evidence, on reliance on a colonial digest by 
Bailee, stating that all Persians were Shia after 1499.
Such a declaration of wakf was possible only in the 20th century, when a 
plethora of wakf legislation was enacted governing the different regions in the 
British Empire, such as the Bihar and Orissa Mussalman Wakf Act, 1926, the 
Bengal Wakf Act, 1934, the Bombay Mussalman Wakf Act, 1935, and the United 
Provinces Muslim Wakf Act, 1936, establishing the legal category of wakf.49 The 
lack of developments between 1886 and 1934 lend credence to this view.
The declaration that the mosque is “property” plays the crucial role in un-
derstanding the key moment in the dispute, which occurred on the night of 
the 22nd/23rd of December, 1949 when idols were placed under the central 
dome of the mosque by Ram devotees. This event laid the foundation for the 
Hindu claim to the property through the presence of the idol and the events 
that followed. On the 29th of December, the property was attached and placed 
under receivership. The scheme by the receiver specified the maintenance of 
bhog (offerings) and puja (worship), and the number of pujaris (priests).50 This 
allowed the worship of the idols without hindrance. The first suit was filed in 
1950 by a Hindu devotee, Gopal Visharad, claiming that he be allowed wor-
ship of the idols without any hindrance. In 1959 another suit was filed by the 
Nirmohi Akhara, the order of the ascetics that had occupied the chabutra. The 
48 Judgment of S.A. Ahsan, Civil Judge, Faizabad dated March 30, 1946, quoted in Noorani, 
Volume 1 (note 39).
49 This is not to argue that the wakf as an institution only came into existence during the 
colonial period. It has existed in the Islamic world for a long period, and was brought into 
India with the advent of Islamic rule. But the legal institution that underlay this form of 
regulation was different from the modern legal framework that takes the form of trusts, 
wakfs, and Hindu endowments, which was created by the British.
50 The Receivers Scheme quoted in Noorani Volume 1 (note 39).
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Sunni Central Board of Wakfs filed a suit in 1961 seeking to restore the mosque 
to the Muslims. In 1986, the locks were opened to facilitate worship by the gen-
eral public, and the dispute became national. This prompted another suit, filed 
in 1989 by representatives of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (the World Council of 
Hindus) a Hindu organization claiming to represent the interests of all Hindus, 
as next friend of the two idols, Bhagwan Ram Lal Virajman and Asthan Ram 
Janam Bhumi, who they claimed were juristic entities.
It is relevant to note at this juncture that the law of Hindu endowments 
had already developed in tandem with the wakf law, and various enactments, 
such as the Mysore Religious and Charitable Institutions Act of 1927, and the 
Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1923 had been passed in differ-
ent regions. Under the law of Hindu endowments in India, the Hindu deity is 
recognized as a juristic person who can sue and be sued. Because the deity, an 
inanimate object, cannot act for itself, it is represented by the shebait or man-
ager who can sue on its behalf. A long list of rulings by colonial judges helped 
establish these principles quite clearly. One of the most important cases was 
Hanooman Persaud Pandey v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree,51 which 
held that the duties of the shebait representing the idol are akin to those of 
the manager of an infant heir’s estate.52 In Pramanatha Mullick v. Pradyumna 
Kumar Mullick,53 the court held that a Hindu idol is a juristic entity that can 
sue and be sued, and that the deity had to be treated as a living being. The 
conception of the idol as significant in making a property claim was therefore 
already available present in the legal consciousness. The action of placing the 
idol under the central dome of the mosque must thus be understood as mak-
ing a property claim, one that crystallized only 40 years later.
Demands by various political parties and Hindu groups affiliated with the 
Ram temple, who mobilized people though various campaigns, such as rath 
yatras,54 finally led to the demolition of the mosque, on December 6, 1992. 
Subsequently, the Central Government of India acquired a large area of about 
68 acres, including the premises in dispute, through Acquisition of Certain 
Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993 (the Acquisition Act). The President of India asked 
the Supreme Court, with reference to Article 143 of the Constitution of India, 
whether a Hindu temple or any Hindu religious structure existed before the 
51 1856 6 m.i.a. 393.
52 This was reiterated in Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram 1887 12 ilr 
Bom 247 and Maharanee Shibesouree Debia, Trustee and Guardian of Her Minor Son 
Koomar Gobindnadh Roy v. Mothooranath Acharjo 1869 13 m.i.a 270.
53 1925 42 i.a. 245.
54 http://www.bjp.org/leadership/shri-lk-advani/yatras/?u=ram-rath-yatra.
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construction of the Ram Janam Bhoomi and Babri Masjid (including the prem-
ises of the inner and outer courtyards on such structure).
The Supreme Court refused to answer the reference.55 It struck down Sec-
tion 4(3) of the Acquisition Act, which had directed abatement of all pending 
suits, as unconstitutional and invalid, and upheld the validity of the remaining 
Act. The result of this decision was that the four suits were revived and decided 
in the landmark judgment of September 30, 2010.
The developments in the latter half of the 20th century are characterized 
by attempts of various parties to the suits to assert property claims on the site. 
But although these claims are couched in the language of secular law, they also 
articulate religious rights. The Supreme Court decision reflects the tension be-
tween protecting religious freedom and guaranteeing property rights.
How are such religious rights enforced as claims to property is evident in a 
statement from the judgment:56
A temple, church or mosque etc. are essentially immovable properties 
and subject to protection under Articles 25 and 26. Every immovable 
property is liable to be acquired. Viewed in the proper perspective, a 
mosque does not enjoy any additional protection which is not available 
to religious places of worship of other religions.
Based on jurisprudence of Articles 25 and 26, the Court also held that “protec-
tion under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is to religious practice which 
forms an essential and integral part of the religion.”57 Thus, a practice could be 
a religious practice but not an essential and integral part of the practice of the 
religion.
In interpreting this principle, the Court held, controversially, that a mosque 
is not an essential part of the practice of Islam, and that namaz or prayers by 
Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in the open. It also held that title to a 
mosque can be lost by adverse possession, quoting the colonial precedent of 
Masjid Shahid Ganj and Ors. v. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 
Amritsar.58 The right of acquisition of a religious place must be made only in 
extraordinary situations, with a larger national purpose in mind, and should 
not result in the extinction of the religious right.
55 Ismail Farooqui v. Union of India air 1995 sc 605.
56 Ibid., Para 85.
57 Ibid., Para 81. The Court here relies on the essential practices test laid down in the Shirur 
Mutt case (note 23), which, however, is not explicitly mentioned.
58 air 1938 Lahore 369.
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The Court drew further on colonial case law by commenting that in British 
India, the right of Muslims to worship in a mosque and of Hindus in a temple 
had always been recognized as a civil right. It further remarked that before 
1950, the year in which the Indian Constitution came into force, the Indian 
Courts in British India had maintained the balance between the different com-
munities or sects in respect of their right of worship. Therefore, the tension 
between religious rights and claims to property was understood as a matter of 
equal treatment of religions.
It is apparent that the various shifts in the dispute have allowed certain 
questions to become predominant. In the 19th century the dispute could be 
characterized as a local conflict between different interest groups, which was 
transformed into a property dispute between two communities: Hindus and 
Muslims. Such a dispute was further defined as being over religious rights to 
property by using the categories of the wakf and of the Hindu endowment. In 
the latter half of the 20th century, the dispute was over the equal treatment 
of religions. These shifts formed the backdrop of the issues and questions 
that were framed and answered by the Allahabad High Court in the Ayodhya 
judgment.
The key questions in this judgment were (a) is the site of the demolished 
mosque the birthplace of Lord Ram? (b) Is the suit a representative one, with 
the two parties to the dispute representing the interests of all Muslims and 
Hindus respectively? (c) What are the rights of adverse possession with respect 
to both Hindus and Muslims at the site? d) How long have the idols on the site 
been in existence? (e) Is the building a mosque? (f) Has it been constructed on 
the site of an alleged Hindu temple? (g) Is the building dedicated to Almighty 
God? (h) Has it been used for prayers by Muslims since time immemorial?
The judgment was delivered by a three-member bench that included Jus-
tice Sibhghat Ullah Khan (the sole Muslim judge), Justice Sudhir Agarwal, and 
Justice Dharam Veer Sharma.59 The judges Khan and Agarwal delivered the 
majority opinion, with Judge Sharma dissenting.
The majority opinion divided the disputed land into three equal parts. The 
area covered by the central dome of the mosque being the place of birth of 
the Hindu deity, Ram, and being occupied by the idol Bhagwan Ram, called 
59 A brief background of the judges is provided at http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/ayodhya 
-verdict-the-judges-who-delivered-todays-verdict-433810. Both Justice Khan and Justice 
Agarwal delivered single judgments, answering the issues in all the suits, Justice Agar-
wal’s judgment running into 21 volumes. Justice Sharma, however, addressed the suits 
separately, delivering separate judgments (the suit numbers are cited when quoting from 
his judgments).
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the Janamsthan, was declared as belonging to the idols as juristic persons. 
The area at the outer courtyard of the mosque, including the chabutra and 
another structure known as the Sita Rasoi, was granted to the Nirmohi Akha-
ra. The Muslim parties (the Sunni Wakf board) and other individual litigants 
were awarded one third of the land, with a direction that the government 
award parts of the land that have been acquired under the Ayodhya Act 
to make up for the deficit. The dissenting judgment, by Judge Sharma, how-
ever, was in favor of the land going to the idols as juristic persons. The Nir-
mohi Akhara refused to accept the decision, claiming rights to the area where 
the idols were placed, covered by the central dome of the mosque. The 
present status of the litigation is that the parties have appealed to the Supreme 
Court.
3 Judging Competing Claims: The History of “Hindu Religion”  
vis-à-vis Islamic Juridical Title to Property
3.1 Colonial Discourse and the Birthplace of Ram
The long and complex litigation involving the Ayodhya dispute resulted in a 
voluminous, 8,000-page judgment on September 30, 2010. The judgment ex-
amined repetitively the evidence of witnesses, which included archaeologists, 
historians, members of the local community (both Hindus and Muslims), 
representatives of the Sunni Wakf Board and of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
among others. It also studied in detail the various legal doctrines used in the 
judgment, such as adverse possession and limitation.
The judgment has been highly criticized for inadequate legal argumenta-
tion and analysis with respect to the property rights of Muslims and its in-
terpretation of the law of limitation. It has also been criticized for being an 
unworkable decision, each of the judges showing inconsistencies in reasoning 
with respect to relief. Justice Khan found joint possession between Hindus and 
Muslims but divided the property into three parts for three different parties: 
the idols, Nirmohi Akhara, and the Muslim community represented by the 
Sunni Wakf Board. Justice Agarwal found that both Hindu and Muslim parties 
had possession of the inner courtyard, but held that the area under the central 
dome should be included in the share of the idols as juristic entities. The open 
area in the outer courtyard was to go to the Nirmohi Akhara and the idols, but 
the constructed area, in the form of the chabutra, and another area known as 
Sita rasoi, was to go to the Nirmohi Akhara. Justice Sharma granted the deities 
the entire property. The verdict has been criticized for its inability to correctly 
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assess historical and archaeological evidence,60 and for using questionable 
historical evidence to arrive at a new doctrine of a place of worship, where a 
birthplace is considered as a deity.61
It is obvious that such a decision is the result of the attempt to answer the 
questions and issues that have been framed. These questions cannot be asked 
and answered without the assumption that Ayodhya was a place of signifi-
cance for the Hindus. As we have seen in the 19th century judgments, such an 
assumption appeared to require no proof or evidence. What was the reason 
for this? In the judgment of September 30, 2010, all three judges relied greatly 
on the gazetteers that recorded the statements of European travelers, colonial 
administrators, etc. to establish that a mosque had been built by Babur (ad-
duced by the Muslim parties), and that the temple of the Hindu deity Ram was 
demolished by him. All the judges accepted the fact that the gazetteers formed 
the basis for legal truth in different ways. Justice Sharma argued that it must 
establish facts of which courts can take judicial notice,62 Justice Agarwal com-
mented that the gazetteers carried an account of true historical facts,63 where-
as Justice Khan used the gazetteers to comment on historical and legal facts.64
These stories begin with William Finch, who in 1608–1611 commented in his 
travel account as follows:65
To Oudh [Ajodhya] from thence are 50c; a citie of ancient note, and seate 
of a Potan king, now much ruined; the castle built foure hundred yeeres 
agoe. Heere are also the ruines of Ranichand66 [s] castle and houses, 
which the Indians acknowled[g]e for the great God, saying that he tooke 
flesh upon him to see the tamasha67 of the World. In these ruines re-
mayne certaine Bramenes, who record the names of all such Indians as 
wash themselves in the river running thereby; which custome, they say, 
hath continued foure lackes of yeeres (which is three hundred ninetie 
foure thousand five hundred yeeres before the worlds creation).
60 See Menon, n. 21.
61 See Gautam Patel, “Idols in Law”, 45(50) Economic and Political Weekly (2010), 47–52.
62 Justice Sharma, Vol. 2 (o.s 4 of 1989), p. 299.
63 Justice Agarwal, Vol. 7, p. 1561.
64 Justice Khan, p. 221.
65 William Foster (ed.), Early Travels in India (Oxford University Press, 1921), 176.
66 Ibid. Rama Chandra, the hero of the Ramayana. The reference is to the mound known as 
the Ramkot or fort of Rama (reproducing the footnote on p. 176).
67 Ibid. Hind. tamasha, a show or spectacle (reproduced in the footnote on p. 176).
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The next account of interest is that of Joseph Tiefenthaler, from 1770, which 
talks about several temples dedicated to Ram, and a heavenly temple where 
Ram carried people to heaven. He also mentions that:68
The emperor Aurangzebe demolished the fortress called Ramcote, and 
erected on the site, a Mohammedan temple with a triple dome. Accord-
ing to others, it was erected by Baber. There are to be seen fourteen col-
umns of black stone, five spans in height, which occupied the site of the 
fortress….
On the left is seen a square chest raised, five inches from the ground cov-
ered with lime, about 5 ells in length by not more than four in breadth. 
The Hindoos call it Bedi, the cradle; and the reason is, that there formerly 
stood here the house in which Beshan (Vishnoo) was born in the form of 
Ram….
Tiefenthaler ends this account by noting that Aurangzeb or Babur had caused 
this place to be destroyed, so that “the heathen could not practice his supersti-
tions,” but the place is still frequented by people who show reverence by going 
around this place three times and by prostrating themselves on the earth.
In 1828, another gazetteer by Walter Hamilton, mentioned the ruins of the 
city, and that inland a mass of rubbish and jungle lay among, which are the 
reputed sites of temples.69 Yet another travel account, by Francis Buchanan 
(compiled by Montgomery Martin), spoke of temple destruction, attributing it 
to Aurangzeb, but adding that the mosque appears to be quite modern and has 
an inscription on its walls indicating that it had been built by Babur. He wrote 
that heaps of bricks have been carried away to build the Muhammadan Ayod-
hya. In digging for bricks, images have been found but they are far too broken 
to know what they represent. He commented that some pillars in the mosques 
built by Babur were made of black stone:70
That they have been taken from a Hindu building, is evident, from the 
traces of images being observable on some of their bases; although the 
images have been cut off to satisfy the conscience of the begot.
68 This extract, which is mentioned as being Annexure iv, “Description of India” by J. Tiefen-
thaler, 129–162, is taken from Justice Sharma Vol. 2 (o.s. 4 of 1989), p. 55.
69 Ibid., 57.
70 Justice Agarwal Volume 7, p. 1718.
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This reference to the mosque is repeated in Edward Thorton’s gazetteer of 
1858,71 which say that Aurangzeb’s demolition of the mosque shows the false-
hood of the tradition because of the inscription referencing Babur. Like Ti-
efenthaler, he observes the cradle of Ram, using the exact language of 5 ells 
long, etc. and the mosque being embellished with 14 columns taken from the 
ruins. He further cites other observations of Buchanan to the effect that heaps 
of bricks in the city attested to the ruins of an ancient and large structure, and 
that the mosque was built with materials taken from the ruins.
These observations become relevant because the archaeological evidence 
uncovered similar truths. Cunningham’s Report of the Archeological Survey of 
India (a.s.i. 1862–1864)72 mentioned that there were several very holy temples 
in Ayodhya, some of them built on the sites of older temples that have been 
destroyed by the Muslims. The Babri Masjid was not, however, mentioned as 
being one of them.
Carnegy’s historical sketch of Faizabad, from 1870,73 turned these historical 
observations into historical truth. He remarked that Ayodhya is for the Hindus 
in the same way Mecca is for the Muslims and Jerusalem is for the Jews. He also 
mentioned specifically the place where Rama was born as being a particular 
temple known as the Janmasthan. He suggested that there must have been a 
temple at the Janmasthan because its columns had been used in the construc-
tion of the Babri Masjid. He added that the pillars of the Babri Masjid were of 
black stone and resembled Buddhist pillars. He also provided an account of 
the 1855 conflict.
The Gazetteer of Oudh, from 1877–1878,74 describes Ayodhya as being:
…to the Hindu what Mecca is to the Mohammadans, Jerusalem to the 
Jews; it has in the traditions of the orthodox, a highly mythical origin, 
being founded for additional security, not on the transitory earth, but on 
the chariot wheel of the Great Creator himself.
An archeological survey report of 1889 corroborated these events by specifi-
cally mentioning the inscriptions on the mosque and the fact that the mosque 
71 See the entry on “Oude” in Edward Thornton, A Gazetteer of the Territories under the 
Government of the East India Company and of the Native States on the Continent of India 
(W.H. Allen, 1858).
72 Alexander Cunningham, Archaeological Survey of India: Four Reports Made During the 
Years 1862–63–64–65 (Government Central Press, 1871), 322.
73 For a discussion of these points, see Justice Khan, 218–221.
74 Judge Sharma, Vol. 2 os 4 of 1989, p. 63.
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was on the spot of the Ram temple known as Janmasthan.75 In 1905, the Fyz-
abad Gazetteer by Neville76 commented that Babur built a mosque at the 
birthplace of Rama in 1528. The Imperial Gazetteer of 190877 further identified 
Rama’s birthplace, adding that it is occupied by the mosque.
The Fyzabad Gazetteer of 1928 repeated the contents of the earlier 
gazetteers:78
It is locally affirmed that at the time of the Musalman conquest there 
were three important Hindu shrines at Ajodhya and little else. These were 
the Janamasthan temple, the Swargaddwar and the Treta-ka-Thakur, and 
each was successively made the object of attention of different Musalman 
rulers. The Janamasthan was in Ramkot and marked the birthplace of 
Rama. In 1528 a.d. Babar came to Ajodhya and halted here for a week. He 
destroyed the ancient temple and on its site built a mosque, still known 
as Babar’s mosque. The materials of the old structure were largely em-
ployed, and many of the columns are in good preservation…
…
3.2 Between the Invader and the Colonizer: Locating Sovereignty  
in Religion and Property
The gazetteers describe a conflict in which a temple has been demolished by 
a medieval Mughal emperor, and a mosque built on its ruins. A crucial point is 
that there is complete silence on this matter before the gazetteers. The courts 
themselves noted that there is no mention of such an incident in Babur’s mem-
oirs. There is also no mention of it in Mughal histories.79 In this conflict, the 
two claims in the legal domain are made by two communities with different 
forms of evidence: a property claim and a historico-theological claim. These 
claims manifested themselves in the use of the categories of the wakf and of 
the endowment, and were based on secular law.
The claim by the representatives of the Muslim community, which is based 
on a notion of title, states that Babur conquered Ayodhya in 1528 and dedi-
cated the mosque to the Almighty. This brought about a property rights claim, 
with the Muslim community adducing evidence of possession since 1528. The 
claim led to a counter-claim by representatives of the Hindus, who argued that 
75 Justice Agarwal Volume 7, p. 1584.
76 Justice Agarwal Volume 7, p. 1572.
77 Ibid., p. 1573.
78 Ibid., pp. 1581–1582.
79 Justice Agarwal Vol. 14, p. 3442.
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one cannot have possession against the deity. They adduced archaeological ev-
idence showing that there had been a temple prior to the building of the Babri 
Masjid, with the deity resident therein, and that the deity Ram had always 
“existed” on the basis of the faith and belief expressed in poetry and stories 
around the deity, such as the Ramcharitmanas and the Ayodhya Mahamatya.
To determine the religious rights of the parties, which had the effect of also 
determining their rights to property, the Court was forced to identify the sover-
eign legal order upon which such property rights could be based and religious 
rights granted. The lawyers representing the Hindu community argued that 
King Babur had acquired sovereignty over Delhi, Agra, and Oudh, defeating 
Sultan Ibrahim Lodi in the battle of Panipat.80 These territories were constitu-
ent of “Dar-ul-Islam” (land under Islamic law) because Ibhrahim Lodi was a 
Muslim and followed the Sharia. Therefore, Babur acquired only those territo-
ries that he could have under the Sharia, and not the land owned by his Hindu 
subjects and their endowments. These contentions cast Babur as an invader 
and not an emperor. All three judges examining this claim were influenced by 
secular property law in their conclusions.
In response to this contention, Justice Agarwal argued that it is not possible 
to say that sovereignty did not rest in Babur. But even if Babur was owner, there 
was no evidence that the wakf had been validly dedicated.81 This was appar-
ent in the inscriptions on the mosque, adduced as evidence of the dedication 
being unreliable (they had been damaged in the 1934 riot).82 There was also 
no evidence in the gazetteers of exclusive possession by Muslims,83 and of the 
fact that Islam does not allow two religions to use the same place of worship.84 
Unlike Islam, there are no similar prohibitions in the Hindu Dharmasastras.85
To reach these conclusions about sovereignty, Justice Agarwal used the 
modern legal concepts of evidence, customary use, and possession to judge the 
claim of the Muslim community regarding its title to property. He also reached 
the conclusion that Babur did not demolish the temple, but argued, that the 
temple had been demolished based on the archaeological evidence. The ar-
chaeological evidence is interpreted based on the assumption that the Hin-
dus considered the site to have religious significance. This once again brings 
into operation secular property law, as Justice Agarwal relied on colonial travel 
80 Justice Agarwal, Vol. 14, p. 3260.
81 Justice Agarwal, Vol. 14, pp. 3288–3289.
82 Justice Agarwal, Vol. 14, pp. 3336–3337.
83 Justice Agarwal, Vol. 8, p. 1767.
84 Ibid.
85 Justice Agarwal, Vol. 14, p. 3341.
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narratives as eyewitness accounts corroborating ownership and possession 
by the Hindus. He noted that travel accounts did not mention worship by the 
Muslims,86 “the building in dispute was constructed but immediately thereaf-
ter or after sometime it stood deserted by Muslims,”87 and that Hindus found a 
way to continue worshiping at the site.
A similar approach was followed by Justice Khan, who also resorted to con-
cepts of secular property law. If Babur demolished the temple, Justice Khan 
asked why this was not recorded in the Ramcharitmanas, a 16th century work 
eulogizing Ram.88 He argued, however, that the gazetteers mention a mosque, 
and therefore the identity of the disputed place should not be in dispute.89 He 
acknowledged that Hindus were also using the place, and therefore Hindus 
and Muslims have joint possession.90 He argued that it was not necessary to 
consider the archaeological evidence.91
Justice Sharma took a different approach and argued that the disputed 
Babri Masjid structure is not a mosque. This marks a radical departure from 
the position of the others, as it rejects modern property law as a primary mode 
of analysis, but does not reject the characterization of the dispute as being 
about title or ownership. Instead, the main mode of analysis becomes history 
and theology, which are used to make a “title” claim on behalf of the Hindus. 
His position on several issues differed from that of the other two judges, but 
was still based on the gazetteers.
Sharma rejected the property rights claim of the Muslims by arguing that 
the revenue grant by the British cannot constitute proof of title.92 He also 
concluded that Babur had demolished the temple but had not acquired title 
because the acquisition was without the consent of the owner. By this action, 
Babur violated the tenets of the Quran, which mandates the consent of the 
owner before taking over property, and which he was obligated to follow as a 
Hanafi Muslim emperor.93 He advocated the use of a historical and theological 
approach, by arguing that the mosque is the birthplace of Ram and deserves 
86 Supra n. 83.
87 Ibid.
88 Justice Khan, pp. 237–238.
89 If the structure on the disputed premises was not a mosque, there was absolutely no occa-
sion, reason, or explanation why idols were not there before 23.12.1949. See Justice Khan, 
pp. 225–226.
90 Justice Khan, p. 282.
91 Justice Khan, pp. 276–277.
92 Justice Sharma, Vol. 1 o.s. No.4/1989, p. 191. This is on the ground that it was a service grant 
to the grantees for collaboration with the British colonial regime.
93 Justice Sharma, Vol. 1 o.s. No.4/1989, pp. 112–113.
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the protection of Article 25 of the Constitution, which is the constitutional 
right of freedom of religion by being an essential practice of the Hindus: He 
argues that94
…the Asthan, Ram Janambhumi has been an object of worship as a deity 
by the devotees of Lord Ram as it personifies the spirit of divine wor-
shipped in the form of Ram Lala or Lord Ram, the child. Ram Janmbhumi 
is also a deity and a juridical person. It is established from evidence that 
the Hindus worship the divine place in the form of God. The Hindus can 
mediate upon the formless and shapeless divine. The spirit of Divine is 
indestructible. Birth place is sacred place for Hindus and Lord Ram, who 
is said to be incarnation of God, was born at this place. The Hindus since 
times immemorial and for many generations constantly hold in great es-
teem and reverence the Ram Janambhumi where they believe that Lord 
Ram was born.
Justice Sharma relied on the gazetteers, classical literature, and oral evidence 
to establish that a temple existed on the premises.95 He also relied on archaeo-
logical evidence, which bore a striking resemblance with the descriptions of 
gazetteers, showing that there was a temple. This included evidence such as 
an inscription of a Vishnu Hari temple, images of Hindu gods on pillars, and 
various kinds of stones that he insisted were from the temple. He argued that 
the structure was not a mosque because it did not have a minaret, idolatrous 
images were present on its pillars, there were no facilities for wazu or ritual 
washing, and it was situated in the midst of Hindu temples that sounded bells 
(a practice that is contrary to Islam).96
The nature of the normative inferences of this claim produced the most 
controversial aspect of the decision: the doctrine that the birthplace of a de-
ity was also a juristic entity. Even more controversially, both Justice Sharma 
and Justice Agarwal argued that the deity was present in the disputed area 
since time immemorial. This allowed the two justices to reject the argument 
94 Justice Sharma, Vol. 4 o.s. No.4/1989, pp. 181–182.
95 This finding was also supported by Justice Agarwal, who argued that the long and con-
tinuous belief of the Hindus, as the enormous amount of oral evidence, was sufficient to 
consider the place as deity. Justice Agarwal, Vol. 20, p. 4997.
96 This was, however, refuted by Justice Khan, who held that it could not be used as a criteri-
on to determine what a mosque is. See Justice Khan, pp. 255–258. All three judges rejected 
the property claim by the Muslims based on the fact that inscriptions in a mosque were 
valid.
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of the Muslim community that even if the deity was resident in the disputed 
area, they have obtained adverse possession since 1528. The judges argued that 
one cannot gain adverse possession against a deity who is a perpetual minor 
and had always existed on the property. This position was, however, refuted by 
Justice Khan, who quoted several judgments to show that the deity was not a 
perpetual minor in law.
Further questions arise regarding the judicial understanding of the Hindu 
endowment that enabled the judges to formulate such a doctrine. Why is there 
a legal debate on the status of the idol as a minor and a plethora of case law 
on the same?97 Why is the deity seen as an entity from which possession can-
not be claimed? Why were claims on the issue of dedication or consecration 
of the idols not taken into account? Why are religious rights entangled within 
property law? Such questions can be answered only within the framework of 
the colonial origins of the dispute and its interaction with secular property law, 
which makes it possible to frame this dispute as one between two religions, 
and consequently apply the principle of equal treatment.
3.3 Determining Religion: The Theological Elements of Modern Property 
Law and Colonial Discourse
A characteristic feature of the judgment was its recognition of the birthplace 
of Ram as an essential part of the Hindu religion and of the core of Hindu faith, 
under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution. This is most apparent in Justice 
Sharma’s decision:98
Lord Ram as the avatar of Vishnu having been born at Ayodhya at the 
Janmasthan is admittedly the core part of Hindu belief and faith which 
is in existence and practiced for the last thousands of years. The Hindu 
scriptures also sanctify it. Article 25 of the Constitution being a funda-
mental right ensures its preservation and no relief can be taken by the 
court which seeks to restrict or altogether extinguish this right.
Justice Agarwal argued similarly when speaking about the Hindu belief in 
Ram:99
97 The case of Pramanatha Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick has already been discussed. 
Other relevant cases concerning the role of the shebait, and comparisons between a mi-
nor and an idol are Prosunno Kumari Debya and Another v. Golab Chand Baboo 1875 2 i.a. 
145, and Tarit Bhushan Rai v. Sree Iswar Sridhar Salgramsila Thakur, air 1942 Cal 99.
98 Justice Sharma, Vol. 4, o.s. No.4/1989, p. 121.
99 Justice Agarwal, Vol. 20, p. 4997.
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… once such belief gets concentrated to a particular point, and in totality 
of the facts, we also find no reason otherwise, it partakes the nature of an 
essential part of religion particularly when it relates to a matter which is 
of peculiar significance to a religion. It, therefore, stands on a different 
footing. Such an essential part of religion is constitutionally protected 
under Article 25.
These inferences are not surprising, as they appear to be drawn from the Su-
preme Court decision on what could be the essential practices of a religion 
(not all religious practices being essential practices). This raises the question 
of how religion itself is conceptualized (we noted above that it has been im-
possible to define religion in law). It appears from the judgment, however, 
that there is a certain conception of religion, derived from colonial discourse, that 
influences property law. It is apparent from the various colonial gazetteers that 
the colonizers had a certain conception of a religion called “Hinduism,” which 
was “superstitious” and therefore easily succumbing to an Islamic invader. This 
conception was restricted by the British colonizers’ cognitive background, 
which recognized religion only within the framework of the Semitic religions’ 
prohibitions against idolatry.
In his analysis of the nature of the Jerusalem Temple, Harold Turner showed 
how the character of the space of the temple represented a radical break with 
the religious traditions of that time.100 Such a break was due to the space no 
longer being considered magical in nature and available to human initiative, 
but “identified with the deity whose power is now inherent in it,” that is, con-
trolling the temple also controls its powers. In the context of the Jerusalem 
temple, such space becomes symbolic of the covenant between the people of 
Israel and their God. This transformation of space was adopted by Christianity 
with a difference, namely that Christ became the center of power and mean-
ing, opening up communication between men and God in a new way.101
This understanding of space necessitated turning spaces for the practices of 
other traditions and the beliefs of others into places of worship of false gods. 
Halbertal and Margalit argued that the Semitic religions perceive that pagans 
as committing an error by worshipping idols, the error being that the idol is 
taken as the representation of God, thus transforming false worship into false 
100 Harold Turner, From Temple to Meeting House: The Phenomenology and Theology of Places 
of Worship (Moulton Publishers, 1979), 83.
101 Ibid., 138.
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belief.102 This false belief is seen as part of a transition, the pagan’s initial belief 
in God being reoriented toward building temples housing idols as representa-
tives of God by the advice of false prophets.103
S.N. Balagangadhara shed further light on the question of worship, arguing 
that being religious involves seeing oneself as part of God’s purposes.104 Be-
cause there is a link between the Will of God and the cause of the universe, 
worship is integral to the believer maintaining faith in such an account. Wor-
ship shows adherence to the exclusive domain of God. Halbertal and Margalit 
elaborated on the nature of this exclusive domain, arguing that:105
The ban on idolatry is an attempt to dictate exclusivity, to map the unique 
territory of the one God. The primary context is worship: worship must 
be exclusive to one force, sacrifices may be made only to God, and no one 
but him may be worshipped.
Such conceptions, derived from the Semitic religions, of religion and ideas of 
worship in Indian traditions, were not limited to the sources found in the gaz-
etteers, and they form a body of discourse about an inferior Hindu religion 
characterized by its fall into idolatry.106 This attitude has infiltrated the legal 
ideas prevalent in the law of Hindu endowments as normative inferences. The 
idol is seen as “another god,” which explains the doctrine of the idol being a 
juristic entity (it is necessary to show that it is the center that controls the pow-
ers of the temple). It also explains other requirements to be proved in law, such 
as dedication and consecration with respect to the idol. The concept of dedi-
cation is crucial to the idol because it acknowledges the idol’s “sovereignty” 
as God. But the idol is not the creator of the universe and cannot claim an 
exclusive domain, therefore the colonial normative inferences that have in-
filtrated the Indian legal system cause a dissonance.107 These inferences in-
clude a representative to act for the idol in the form of the shebait (manager) 
or other worshippers. Although such representatives are supposed to perform 
102 Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry (Naomi Goldblum, trans.), (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1992).
103 Ibid.
104 See Balagangadhara, n. 31.
105 Supra n. 102, 5.
106 See Geoffery Oddie, Imagined Hinduism: British Protestant Missionary Constructions of 
Hinduism, 1793–1900 (Sage Publications, 2006). See also Richard King, n. 31.
107 For more details on the conditions that underlie the legal category of the place of worship 
that includes dedication, God’s authority, and the public and the private, see Srikantan, 
n. 38.
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the function of a trustee, in practice they do the opposite and do not act for 
the idol but “act” as the idol. The idol cannot have purposes in the manner in 
which the God of Abrahamic religions has purposes for mankind. Moreover, 
worship of the idol also cannot be seen as understanding or adhering to its 
“will.”108 Therefore, the manager exercises control over the properties vested in 
the idol in the way he deems fit.
This dissonance becomes particularly jarring when a dispute arises and an-
other property claim falls within the framework of the Semitic religions. This 
happens in the case of the wakf, where dedication to God must be absolute, 
with total divestment of human ownership.109 In the case of the Hindu idol, 
these terms pose a challenge, dedication being a form of ritual toward the idol, 
performed by humans. This does not have the same character as dedication in 
the case of the wakf, being less compatible with the concept of ownership and 
transfer in property law.
It is relevant to note that in this judgment, Justices Agarwal and Sharma 
dispensed with the question of dedication altogether, arguing for the special 
status of the birthplace. In doing so, they adopted a conception of religion that 
conforms with colonial perceptions recorded in the gazetteers and travel ac-
counts. This is most visible in a statement by Justice Agarwal on the nature of 
faith and belief among the Hindus:110
The dispute of Al Aqsa in Jerusalem… treated to be the third most pious 
place by muslims since they believe that Prophet Muhammad descended 
thereat after visiting heaven, nobody even doubt their faith but one can 
always ask a question that Jerusalem is not mentioned in Quran at all 
while Mecca and Madina words have been used innumerably then what 
is the evidence for such belief but then one must understand and appre-
ciate that in the matter of faith and religion such things cannot be asked. 
A religion itself means if some people believe something and worship as 
a matter of right, since the time immemorial, the others must not raise 
any doubt. Simple logic is that failing to find evidence to something does 
not necessarily result in that the thing does not exist.
In trying to make Ayodhya the “Jerusalem of the Hindus,” the judges de-
ployed not only the theological framework of the Semitic religions but also 
108 Despite this incongruence, there are Indian court decisions such as the Pramanatha case 
(n. 52) that speak of the will of the idol.
109 See Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar 1921 48 i.a. 302.
110 Justice Agarwal, Vol. 19, p. 4551.
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the normative inferences that have seeped into property law. By defining wor-
ship as belonging to the exclusive domain of God as sovereign, they held that 
there can be no adverse possession against the deity. By reiterating that the 
birthplace of a deity was a juristic person, they sought to model the Indian 
traditions described as Hinduism according to the framework of the Semitic 
religions. This is manifest in Justice Sharma’s argument that the “Nature of 
Hindu religion is monism. It believes in one supreme being, who manifests 
Himself in many form,”111 and the existence of an idol, although desirable, is 
not a legal precondition for worship, as divinity can also be formless.112 Images 
are symbols of a Supreme God to whom all the functions of creation, preserva-
tion, and destruction are attributed.113
This approach causes further dissonance in the attempt of the Court to 
interpret archaeological evidence in its favor. Prominent archaeologists have 
criticized the handling of archaeological evidence by the Court on the ground 
that it did not meet the professional standards of archaeology as a discipline.114 
In a commentary on the judgment, it has been argued that black stone pillars, 
a mutilated sculpture, and a stone slab with symbols cannot be understood 
as constituting a temple because they could have been introduced from any-
where.115 It is further argued that excavations do not show the presence of a 
“north Indian temple,” which needs to have certain features, such as pillared 
porches.
Such criticism, as Tapati Guha-Thakurta has pointed out,116 does not ques-
tion the epistemology within archaeology itself, that is, the manner by which 
it produces knowledge and converts objects into monuments. It also does not 
deal with the theological framework by which a temple is described in law. 
Within the framework provided by the justices, a temple could be practically 
any structure, provided evidence is adduced of “belief in its divinity.”
111 Justice Sharma, o.s. No.5/1989, p. 173.
112 Justice Sharma, Vol. 4 o.s. 4 of 1989, p. 30.
113 Justice Sharma, Vol. 4 o.s. 4 of 1989, p. 32.
114 See Shereen Ratnagar, “Archeaology at the Heart of a Political Confrontation”, 45(2) Cur-
rent Anthropology (2004), 239–259. See also Ram Sharan Sharma, “The Ayodhya Issue” in 
Robert Layton, Peter G. Stone and Julian Thomas (eds.), Destruction and Conservation of 
Cultural Property (Routledge, 2001).
115 See Supriya Varma and Jaya Menon, “Was there a Temple Under the Babri Masjid: Reading 
the Archaeological Evidence”, 45(50) Economic and Political Weekly (2010), 61–72.
116 See Tapati Guha-Thakurta “Archaeology as Evidence: Looking Back from the Ayodhya De-
bate”, Occasional Working Paper No. 159 (Centre for the Study of Social Sciences, Calcutta, 
1997).
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4 Conclusion
The Ayodhya litigation exposes difficulties in the application of the doctrine 
of secularism outside predominantly Christian and Western societies. The dif-
ficulty of the Indian state in applying the doctrine of secularism, that is, the 
inability of the state to be neutral and to treat religions in an equal manner, 
is extremely noticeable in the above analysis. The inability does not lie in the 
inadequacy of the application of the doctrine of secularism but in its conse-
quences for the social phenomena to which it is applied.
In the case of the Ayodhya dispute, we have seen how colonialism intro-
duced certain normative inferences about the nature of different communities 
and the relationships between them, leading to a local conflict being described 
as a religious one. The introduction of secular property law in determining the 
religious rights of Hindus and Muslims further exacerbated the conflict, as 
the courts found it difficult to apply the principle of equal treatment because 
the application of the wakf and the Hindu endowment has different results in 
property law. Concepts of ownership, transfer, and sovereignty lack cognitive 
value with respect to the Hindu endowment because of the status of the idol as 
a juristic entity. The courts are thus forced to rework legal categories to make re-
ligions “equal.” This is apparent in the pronouncement that a deity has a birth-
place, which attempts to emulate the model of a formless creator God in the 
Semitic religions, and in the process distorts Indian traditions and practices.
The application of the doctrine of equal treatment of religions in the Ayod-
hya dispute leads to more conflict and antagonism between communities be-
cause of these inadequate legal models and the normative inferences that have 
played a role in describing the dispute as religious. It is worthwhile to note that 
this dispute has its origins in colonial descriptions, and that many of the legal 
concepts and categories that have been used in the judgment also have their 
origins in colonialism. Reworking legal concepts and categories is inadvisable, 
unless the normative references replete in colonial discourse are unraveled. 
This includes not only concepts contained in secular property law and their 
application, but also the perspective that the relationships between communi-
ties are of religious antagonism, because these descriptions are enabled by the 
normative inferences introduced by colonialism.
These findings also shed light on the practical effects of the doctrine of 
secularism as practiced by the Indian state. They show that the concept of 
equal treatment between religions can be unworkable in the legal domain. 
This should make us rethink not only secularism but also the manner in which 
religious freedom, such as the right to worship, is articulated. This poses new 
challenges for understanding relationships between communities.
